The 2016  White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr : An Analysis of its Positioning, Reception, and Conditions of Implementation by Ashburn, Hunter Lee
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2017
The 2016 "White Paper on German Security Policy
and the Future of the Bundeswehr": An Analysis of
its Positioning, Reception, and Conditions of
Implementation
Hunter Lee Ashburn
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ashburn, Hunter Lee, "The 2016 "White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr": An Analysis of its
Positioning, Reception, and Conditions of Implementation" (2017). CMC Senior Theses. 1454.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1454
Claremont McKenna College 
 
The 2016 “White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”: An Analysis 
of its Positioning, Reception, and Conditions of Implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to 
Profess Hans Rindisbacher 
 
 
By 
Hunter Lee Ashburn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For 
Senior Thesis 
Fall 2016 
December 5th, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
My unyielding thanks to my reader, Professor Hans Rindisbacher. Hans, thank you for, to 
opening your home to me over thanksgiving, giving me those knowing winks, and 
emailing me back long after midnight. 
I also need to thank Professor Friederike von Schwerin-High and Professor Marc Katz, 
who invited me into the German family of the Claremont Colleges. Without you, I 
wouldn’t have majored in German, studied abroad, or been the person I am today. 
I am deeply indebted to Professor Jennifer Taw, who took me into her War Seminar as a 
sophomore, and changed the trajectory of my life and career. You taught me how to think 
critically and examine the world around me; an immeasurable skill with an immeasurable 
payoff. You opened your heart and home to me time and time again. I am lucky to have 
known you. 
I need to thank the Army, for giving me the opportunity to prove myself, in and out of the 
classroom. I need to thank the generic “you”, (if you pay US taxes) for funding my 
education—I hope I’ve made you proud. 
Above all, my family. For letting me run away to California to find myself, but always 
letting me come home. Mom, Dad, Allison—not to mention Seth, John, Michelle, 
Amelia, Heather, Dhario, Chris, Tony and Ellen (with countless others)—thank you for 
your love, your laughter, your steadfastness, and not letting my ego go unchecked.  
You will be in my heart forever.   
iii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………...…………...…ii 
Abstract…………………………………………………………...………………………iii 
Chapter 1: Genealogy of the White Paper and Initial Reaction…………………………...1 
Chapter 2: Main Policy Thrusts of the White Paper……………………………………..10 
Chapter 3: Ambivalence of Domestic Support…………………………………………..27  
Chapter 4: International Reactions to the White Paper………………………………..…39 
Chapter 5: The Way Forward: Obstacles to implementation of the White Paper……….48 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………..59 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the new German 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr. Updated for the first time in over a decade, the document 
reflects Germany’s reorientation of its security policy in order to become a global player. 
This study analyzes the White Paper to determine its contextual meaning, domestic as 
well as international support, and obstacles in the way of its implementation. Although 
the German Government is concerned about waning US influence and increased Russian 
activity, the German people are reluctant to let go of their nation’s foreign political 
restraint in light of a lingering feeling of historical responsibility going back their Fascist 
past and to WWII. The international and European reaction to the White Paper is largely 
positive and hails Germany as a defender of Western Liberalism. Russia is less 
enthusiastic and has embraced information warfare as a means of displaying its 
displeasure. The study finds that resolving these issues will prove critical for the practical 
success of failure in implanting the designs of the White Paper. 
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Genealogy of the White Paper and Initial Reaction 
 The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr represents a reorientation of German Foreign Policy that calls for 
remilitarization and increased German influence in the international community. This 
Study will trace the history and background of the new German Strategic Framework 
offered by the White Paper, analyze signals sent by the document to other countries, 
determine domestic, then international reaction to the White Paper, and describe the three 
biggest problems facing implementation of the White Paper while proposing ways to 
address each.  
 The purpose of this thesis is not to debate particular policies included in the White 
Paper, or to predict whether the White Paper is the correct path for Germany to take. 
Since the White Paper has been published to wide support within the German political 
elite, it seems likely that its proposed strategies will be pursued. This thesis will instead 
focus on understanding the White Paper, analyzing reaction to it, and determining 
challenges in its future.  
In tracing the gestation of the White Paper, we first have to note that is an update 
to a previous White Paper, the one from 2006. However, the 2016 White Paper is not 
merely an update of language and tactics; rather it represents a transition to a new 
German self-image.  This change first became visible in the updated Defence Policy 
Guidelines, released in May of 2011. Much stayed the same, like the emphasis on 
“security and protection of German Citizens,” but for the first time it securitized 
problems like failing states and climate change, turning them into issues of national 
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security.1 These guidelines also called for reforms to the Bundeswehr, as the German 
government looked toward the end of compulsorily military service slated to begin in 
July of the same year.2  
 Especially the need to transform the Bundeswehr into an attractive employer led 
the Bundeswehr to publish The Reorientation of the German Army: Fight-Protect-Help-
Mediate in July of 2013. This document directly acknowledges the “political framework” 
set forth by the 2011 guidelines, and establishes the Army’s focus as “Success on 
Operations,” before moving into specific reforms of the army, such as recruiting reforms 
and the restructuring of certain commands and specific units.3  
In the same year, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs, published “New Power, New Responsibility: 
Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a changing world.”4 The report 
heavily influenced the 2016 White Paper, which essentially quotes much of it. It called 
on Germany to use its newfound power to re-enter international politics. New Power, 
New responsibility contrasted sharply with the influential Economist article, Europe’s 
Reluctant Hegemon which emphasized the German population’s reluctance to be seen as 
leaders, in military endeavors and more broadly in European society. The Economist 
                                                          
1 German Minister of Defense. "Defence Policy Guidelines." German Ministry of Defence. May 27, 2011. 
Accessed October 20, 2016. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157024/Germany%20engl.pdf. 
2 Smith, David Gordon. "'End of an Era' as Germany Suspends Conscription." SPIEGEL ONLINE. January 
4, 2011. Accessed October 22, 2016. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-
end-of-an-era-as-germany-suspends-conscription-a-737668.html. 
3 Kasdorf, Bruno, and Army Change Management, Bonn. "The Reorientation of the German Army: Fight-
Protect-Help-Mediate." July 2013. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
4 Kaim, Markus, and Constanze Stelzenmueller. "New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German 
Foreign. Security Policy for a Changing World." Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik/The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, 2013. 
https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/GermanForeignSecurityPolicy_S
WP_GMF_2013.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us 
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article citied Germany’s guilt over its past and fifty-year occupation by American and 
Russian forces.5 These two publications revealed the beginning of the split in outlook 
between political elites and ordinary Germans, which chapters three and five will discuss.  
The most significant development in 2014 was the publication of Review 2014—A 
Fresh Look at Foreign Policy, a report on the yearlong effort to revamp Germany’s 
Foreign Policy. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier ordered a comprehensive 
evaluation of the ministry broken into three parts. The Review engaged with fifty foreign 
policy experts around the world, its own employees, and held extensive talks with the 
public at large to answer the question, “What, if anything, is wrong with German foreign 
policy?” The Review ended with a summarized conclusion from the government.6 The 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in “The ‘2014 Review’: Understanding the 
Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the Expectations of the Rest of the World,” 
summarized and analyzed the findings from a more critical perspective. The author 
declared, “It is both inappropriate and unacceptable for policy to hide behind public 
hearings, surveys or consultations with experts: policy must take a position and have the 
courage to decide.”7  Germany began acting on the Review by introducing the 
Framework Nations Concept at the 2014 NATO summit.8 The Bundeswehr 
                                                          
5 Beddoes, Zanny Minton. "Europe's Reluctant Hegemon." The Economist. June 15, 2013. Accessed 
October 01, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-now-dominant-
country-europe-needs-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and. 
6 Germany. Federal Foreign Office. Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy. Berlin: Bonifatius 
GmbH, Paderborn, 2014. 
7 Bendiek, Annegret. "The "2014 Review": Understanding the Pillars of German Foreign Policy and the 
Expectations of the Rest of the World." Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik Aktuell, October 2014. 
8 Major, Claudia, and Christian Moelling. "The Framework Nations Concept." Stiftung Wissenschaft Und 
Politik, December 2014. 
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simultaneously underwent the reform process in its attempts to entice attractive recruits 
into its service.9  
Carnegie Europe published “The Right Kind of German Leadership for Europe,” 
which claimed Germany lost sight of its vision for a unified Europe, lost its usual 
propensity for compromise, and stopped cultivating relationships with its smaller 
neighbors, all of which are critical to foreign policy success.10 Carnegie also published 
“Germany, still the Reluctant Hegemon,” which further discussed the divide between 
Germany’s wish to align its de facto power and responsibility with the German 
population’s “Culture of Restraint” since 1945. It further pointed out Germany’s lack of 
hard power, emphasizing reports of maintenance problems with materiel, citing a finding 
that only seven of forty-three naval helicopters were operational at that time.11 Finally, 
the Financial Times article, “Merkel Seeks to Navigate Germany’s Complex Relations 
with Russia,” showed the growing German doubt that sanctions against Russia were not 
succeeding.12  
In 2015, specific reforms began to take shape, and Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, 
Academic Director of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy, published an 
Op-Ed listing five lessons the German government might learn from other countries who 
                                                          
9 Smale, Alison. "A Dwindling Army Tempts New Recruits With a Charm Offensive." New York Times. 
July 27, 2014. Accessed November 2, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/world/europe/german-
army-a-dwindling-army-tempts-new-recruits-with-a-charm-offensive.html?_r=0. 
10 Techau, Jan. "The Right Kind of German Leadership for Europe." Carnegie Europe. October 28, 2014. 
Accessed October 01, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57046. 
11 Wijs, Sacha De. "Germany, Still the Reluctant Hegemon." Carnegie Europe. November 07, 2014. 
Accessed October 01, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57163. 
12 Wagstyl, Stefan. "Merkel Seeks to Navigate Germany's Complex Relations with Russia." Financial 
Times. May 1, 2014. Accessed November 2, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/b163e942-d07c-11e3-8b90-
00144feabdc0. 
5 
 
pursued a “comprehensive” foreign policy initiative such as the White Paper proposes.13 
The SWP in “The White Paper on Defense Policy” emphasized that the last 20 years of 
military history only offered two lessons, namely that the world, as it once was, was in 
upheaval, and that the strategic environment and the effects of one’s actions were less 
predictable than ever. The point being that the White Paper cannot and should not offer 
specific policies, but rather outline a general mode of thinking and options for unknown 
circumstances.14 The military outlined its vision of “Leadership from the Middle” 
meaning to lead by example, and from not just the geographic but political center of the 
EU to ensure cooperation by its entirety.15 Dr. Robin Niblett, director of Chatman House 
and former COO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies  delivered a speech 
in Berlin on “International Expectations from Germany” where he called on Germany to 
see itself not as a, “Mid-size power,” but as a, “mid-sized great power,” with significant 
ability to affect its security environment.16 
Meanwhile in 2015, Russian-German relations continued to gain complexity. 
Russia began its “War on Information” in earnest, by driving BBC and CNN off Russian 
airwaves in favor of government-controlled outlets.17 “Dominant Narratives in Russian 
Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis” discussed common threads of 
                                                          
13 Kamp, Karl-Heinz. Vernetztes Handeln Im Internationalen Vergleich (persoenliche Meinung). Federal 
Ministry of Defence. Bmvg. July 30, 2015. Accessed October 22, 2016. 
https://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDM
wMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY5NjI2MTc3NjI3OTZiNzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/Kamp_Vernetztes%2520Hande
ln%2520im%2520internationalen%2520Vergleich.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. 
14 Linnenkamp, Hilmar, and Christan Moelling. "Das Weissbuch Zur Verteidigungspolitik."Stiftung 
Wissenschaft Und Politik Aktuell 21 (February 2015). 
15Marberg, Jan. "Fuehrung Aus Der Mitte." Bundeswehr Aktuell, February 9, 2015. 
16 Niblett, Robin Christian Howard. "Internationale Erwartungen an Deutschland." Speech, Berlin, 
February 17, 2015. 
17 Armstrong, Matt. "Russia's War on Information." War on the Rocks. August 10, 2015. Accessed 
November 26, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/russias-war-on-information/. 
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Russian propaganda and noted Russia’s attempt to maintain relations with Europe while 
still separating it from the US.18 Pew Global found that 58% of Germans thought their 
government should not use force if Russia invaded a neighboring country that is a NATO 
ally.19 This sentiment was much more prevalent in the former DDR, especially as 
Germany attempted to maintain sanctions against Russia while leaving negotiations open 
for a Russian-German Gas Pipeline.20 
German Foreign Policy in 2016 was naturally defined by the White Paper itself, 
which was published in July by the German Government in both German and English.21  
Due to the short time it has been publically available, the White Paper has generated few 
in depth reports thus far. Instead, current events and news articles have dominated 
discussion on Germany’s Foreign Policy. Short pieces such as the article from War on the 
Rocks “Germany Embraces Realpolitik Once More” summarize the White Paper more 
than analyze it.22 The Center for Strategic and International Studies not only applauded 
the White Paper but also called for greater German Leadership within Europe.23 In the 
                                                          
18 Hutchings, Stephen, and Joanna Szostek. "Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse 
during the Ukraine Crisis." E-International Relations. April 29, 2015. Accessed November 26, 2016. 
http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/28/dominant-narratives-in-russian-political-and-media-discourse-during-the-
crisis/. 
19 Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, 
but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. June 10, 
2015. Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-
ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/. 
20 Steinhauser, Gabriele. "Germany's Merkel Defends Russian Gas Pipeline Plan." WSJ. December 18, 
2015. Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-merkel-defends-russian-gas-
pipeline-plan-1450447499. 
21 Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper On German Security Policy and The Future Of The 
Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016. 
22 Deni, John R. "Germany Embraces Realpolitik Once More." War on the Rocks. September 18, 2016. 
Accessed November 15, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/germany-embraces-realpolitik-once-
more/. 
23 Rathke, Jeffrey. "Rising Ambitions and Growing Resources Mark New German Security Strategy." 
Center for  Strategic and International Studies. July 25, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/rising-ambitions-and-growing-resources-mark-new-german-security-strategy. 
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same vein, Foreign Affairs announced, “Germany will be a responsible, restrained, and 
reflective leader, guided in chief by its European instincts.”24 
Domestically, most of the political elite supported the White Paper, although the 
right wing party, Alternative für Deutschland claims, “[the] White Paper leads the 
military in the wrong direction.”25 
Another great theme of 2016 on the global stage has been the American election. 
Of particular note was the near universal complaint by all presidential candidates that 
NATO was not pulling its own weight.26 After the election of Donald Trump, just a few 
days ago as of the date of this writing, Angela Merkel announced her candidacy for her 
fourth term as Chancellor, leading many to call her, “The Liberal West’s Last 
Defender.”27 
Russia reacted poorly to the White Paper. Thus the Russian Today article “From 
Partner to Rival: Germany to Designate Russia ‘a Security Challenge.’”28 Russia is 
continuing its information war on Germany, producing heavily biased newspaper articles, 
prompting Deutsche Welle to report “Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German 
                                                          
24 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. "Germany's New Global Role." Foreign Affairs. August 15, 2016. Accessed 
October 01, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13/germany-s-new-global-role. 
25 Pazderski, Georg. "Das Weissbuch Fuhrt Die Bundeswehr in Die Falsche Richtung." Alternative Fuer 
Deutschland. July 14, 2016. Accessed November 26, 2016. https://www.alternativefuer.de/pazderski-das-
weissbuch-fuehrt-die-bundeswehr-in-die-falsche-richtung/. 
26 Kessler, Glenn. "Trump’s Claim That the U.S. Pays the ‘lion’s Share’ for NATO." Washington Post. 
March 30, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/03/30/trumps-claim-that-the-u-s-pays-the-lions-share-for-nato/. 
27 Smale, Alison, and Steven Erlanger. "Donald Trump’s Election Leaves Angela Merkel as the Liberal 
West’s Last Defender." The New York Times. November 12, 2016. Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/europe/germany-merkel-trump-election.html?_r=0. 
28 "From Partner to Rival: Germany to Designate Russia 'a Security Challenge' – Report." RT International. 
June 5. 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016. https://www.rt.com/news/345466-germany-security-
challenges-russia/. 
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Elections.”29 However, German support for Russia did not appear to wane as claimed in 
“Frayed Partnership: German Public Opinion on Russia.”30 
The EU has begun to seriously consider the idea of a European Army, and 
Votewatch, in a piece titled “What Chances for a Real European Common Security and 
Defense Policy?” analyzed the EU’s reactions to those proposals.31 Carnegie Europe 
detailed problems for a successful integration of a European Army in “Policy or Project? 
France, Germany, and EU Defense.”32 However, after the election of Donald Trump to 
the American presidency, a frantic meeting was called where broad support for increased 
European security was found.33 
Finally, the German Government has begun to move towards its next foreign 
policy publication, soliciting public opinion through the Peacelab 2016 format.34 
Overall, it needs to be pointed out that the build-up and subsequent reaction to the 
2016 White Paper did not happen quite in the linear fashion as sketched here, as foreign 
                                                          
29 "Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German Elections." DW.COM. November 8, 2016. 
Accessed November 26, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-warns-of-russian-cyber-attacks-in-german-
elections/a-36314197. 
30 Scholer, Gabriele, and Agnieska Lada. "Frayed Partnership: German Public Opinion on 
Russia." Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, Institute of Public Affairs, April 2016. Accessed November 11, 
2016. https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Frayed_Partnership_2016_ENG.pdf. 
31 Chitul, Eva, and Doru Frantescu. "What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense 
Policy?" VoteWatch What Chances for a Real European Common Security and Defense Policy Comments. 
September 29, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. http://www.votewatch.eu/blog/what-chances-for-a-
real-european-common-security-and-defense-policy/. 
32 KEOHANE, DANIEL. "Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense." Carnegie Europe. 
August 2, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64222. 
33 Mailonline, Dave Burke For. "EU Chief Mounts Fresh Call for European Army, Claiming 'Americans 
Won't Protect Us Forever'" Mail Online. November 10, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3923068/EU-chief-mounts-fresh-call-European-army-claiming-
Americans-won-t-protect-forever.html. 
34 "PeaceLab2016: A Fresh Look at Crisis Prevention." PeaceLab2016. August 14, 2016. Accessed 
November 02, 2016. 
http://www.peacelab2016.de/peacelab2016/debatte/friedensfoerderung/article/peacelab2016-a-fresh-look-
at-crisis-prevention/. 
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policy initiatives are influenced by constantly changing risks, interests, and opinions of 
the domestic and international community. The next chapter, therefore, will break down 
the White Paper and analyze its meaning as reflected in the reactions of other nations and 
institutions, while subsequent chapters will consider the domestic and then international 
reactions to the document. The conclusion will offer advice for overcoming the three 
biggest obstacles to a successful implementation of the White Paper: an uncooperative 
yet influential Russia, a perceived lack of domestic support, and the need for quick action 
within the EU. 
10 
 
Main Political Thrusts of the White Paper 
 The 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr is not the first written by the German Government. In fact, Germany 
published a White Paper yearly from 1969 to 1976, and thereafter in 1979, 1983, 1985, 
1994, and 2006. The time between the 2006 White Paper and the 2016 is the second 
largest gap in the history of German White Paper publication. The first chapter discussed 
the lineage of the new White Paper, but this chapter will focus on the question of why a 
new White Paper needed to be written. 
 Chancellor Merkel’s answer in the forward is that due to the, “changed security 
situation, the task of the Federal Government is to redefine our country’s security policy 
interests, priorities and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly.”1 The second 
purpose is, “to generate a debate in society on how Germany shapes its security policy in 
the future.” Her letter defines what the Security Paper is and why a strategy is needed, but 
other than the same vague claim that, “our security environment has changed 
considerably since [2006],”2 it does not answer, “why 2016?”  
 The simplest answer is that it takes a long time for a bureaucracy the size a 
government to gather, analyze, and synthesize data into a comprehensive document. It 
took 2 years after Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier began “Review 2014—A 
Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” to create the White Paper. The Foreign Minister reached 
out to fifty experts abroad, employees in the Federal Foreign Office, and the German 
                                                          
1 Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper On German Security Policy and The Future Of The 
Bundeswher. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016, 6. 
2 Ibid., 15. 
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public to ask, “What, if anything, is wrong with German Foreign Policy? What needs to 
be changed?”3   The responses fit overwhelming into two categories and drove the 
creation of the White Paper. 
 The first answer was that, “To the majority of those surveyed, what is wrong with 
German policy is not so much specific actions or omissions, but rather a perceived lack of 
predictability.”4 Experts living across the globe wrote statements like, “Germany’s Africa 
policy is ambivalent,” “Gulf States don’t see a clear German foreign policy strategy,” and 
“Germany: An Unsure Power in Conflicts,” in South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and 
Afghanistan respectively.5 This indicated a collective failure by the German government 
to articulate its goals, policies, and methods coherently. 
 The second issue was the, “growing gulf between the expectation of Germany’s 
allies and partners that it take on a larger role in international politics, and Germany’s 
self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which the German public largely favors.”6 
Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is said to have long neglected to 
sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable to dependable foreign 
policy.”7 The lack of a clear mandate by the German people is a barrier to German 
projection of power, and is addressed at length in the third chapter. 
 While written as a response to a, “changed security situation,” the security 
environment is always changing and chronically unknowable. This cannot be the sole 
reason for writing a new White Paper. Instead, it is a signaling device to other countries. 
                                                          
3 Germany. Federal Foreign Office. Review 2014--A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy. Berlin, 2014. 
4 Ibid., 20. 
5 Ibid., 23. 
6 Ibid., 21. 
7 Ibid., 20. 
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It is not the changed security environment but the need to update German relations with 
other countries that convinced Germany to also update its White Paper. 
Germany’s updated foreign policy means different things to different actors, and 
the differences are worth examining. The White Paper is comprehensive, yet broad. Just 
as in the White Paper, this chapter examines selected countries or alliances alone while 
making general assumptions about other groups of countries, and will start with the 
European Union. 
The preamble of the German Basic Law states Germany’s, “determination to 
promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe [emphasis added].8  
Germany doubles down on this commitment with the new White Paper. It acknowledges 
that, “what is important for the common security space of our continent is thus not the 
development of a new security architecture…but adherence to existing and proven 
common rules and principles.”9 Germany benefits immensely from interconnected 
Europe; unfortunately, it also foresees an erosion of the EU. Written before the Brexit, 
the White Paper addresses the fact that the European Project is, “under pressure.”10 
Whereas the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines stated German security interest as, 
“strengthening transatlantic and European security and partnership,”11 the White Paper 
describes its security interest as, “deepening European integration.”12 This subtle change 
of words disguises large meaning for Germany’s future in Europe. There is a fundamental 
                                                          
8 German Basic Law, 13. 
9 White Paper, 32. 
10 Ibid., 33. 
11 German Minister of Defense. "Defence Policy Guidelines." German Ministry of Defence. May 27, 2011. 
Accessed October 20, 2016. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157024/Germany%20engl.pdf. 4. 
12 White Paper, 25. 
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difference between partnership and integration. Partnership can be as small as a single 
unilateral agreement such as an economic, security, or political policy. Integration is the 
merging and pooling of resources. For example, France wants a security partnership with 
Germany but to retain the autonomy to intervene unilaterally, whereas Germany seeks to 
integrate all European hard-power into a “European Army.”13  
The apocryphal quote of Henry Kissinger that Germany is, “too big for Europe, 
too small for the world,” is taken to heart by the White Paper. The paper acknowledges 
that, “The economies of emerging powers in Asia and Latin America will likely overtake 
the German—although not the European—gross domestic product in the coming 
years.”14 Germany is signaling to its neighbors that the best way to stay relevant and 
carry influence in the 21st century is by sticking together in all respects—although this 
study focuses on EU security initiatives.  
 Germany believes in “Fuehrung aus der Mitte,” or, “leading from the center.” In 
essence, this means setting the example and being the change Germany wants to see in 
the world. At the 51st Munich security conference, Defense Minister Ursula von der 
Leyen described leading from the center as, “being the best at providing resources and 
professional expertise among our allies and partners.”15 Since World War II, Germany 
has been averse to leading from the front, and leads more comfortably by example and 
consensus. Fuehrung aus der Mitte is a way to balance Germany’s interest in maintaining 
the European Union with Germany’s reluctance to actually direct fellow member-states. 
                                                          
13 KEOHANE, DANIEL. "Policy or Project? France, Germany, and EU Defense." Carnegie Europe. 
August 2, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2016. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64222. 
14 White Paper, 22. 
15 Marberg, Jan. "Fuehrung Aus Der Mitte." Bundeswehr Aktuell, February 9, 2015. 1. 
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As mentioned, the ultimate goal of European security integration for Germany is 
to create a European army. The White Paper seeks to achieve this through the Framework 
Nations Concept (FNC). The FNC is essentially an updated version of the “Pooling and 
Sharing” program proposed by Germany in 2013, with the idea that Germany, France, 
Great Britain, and possibly Italy and Turkey will take leadership as a “cluster.” Smaller 
states than integrate their armies under the leadership of a cluster. In this case, the big 
states provide the breadth of military operations while the smaller nations inside the 
cluster provide the depth with personnel, equipment, and funding.16 The German think-
tank SWP rightfully recognizes that once these clusters have been created, it will take 
significant political capital to withdraw troops from one. German politicians have a, 
“common understanding that integrated European Forces can only be achieved in a step-
by-step approach,” and the FNC is the beginning of such a concept .17 So far 16 countries 
have joined the FNC. There has not been an official British withdrawal from the FNC 
following the Brexit, and the Polish Defense Minister claims, “Britain’s military 
involvement will not only be upheld, but also increased.”18 The fourth chapter addresses 
the success of the FNC and the future of an integrated European Army. 
  By re-committing themselves to the FNC, however, Germany is highlighting its 
commitment to financial and operational relevance. As with all German policies enacted 
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with a “Leading from the Middle” approach, explicitly stating its commitment and 
progress with the FNC goads Germany’s neighbors into action as well. 
Germany continues to establish bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, with the 
end goal of building trust and cohesion. These agreements provide a common ground to 
leverage those countries into the FNC. Germany is thus a part of the French-German 
Brigade, the German-Netherlands Corps, the German-Polish-Danish Multinational Corps, 
the Multinational Joint Headquarters in Ulm, and rotational leadership of the Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force; it actively participates within the European Corps and 
regularly contributes troops to standing NATO operations such as the Airborne Warning 
and Control System. Germany also has a permanent mutual exchange of troops with both 
the Netherlands and Poland, and in July 2016, Germany stationed a battalion in Lithuania 
to serve as a deterrent to perceived Russian aggression.19  
Germany also plans a European Army in a simpler way, by opening up the 
Bundeswehr to any citizens of the EU for military service, similar to the French Foreign 
Legion. The White Paper claims, “Opening up the Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU 
would not only offer potential wide-ranging integration and regeneration and thus 
strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it would also send out a strong signal 
for a European approach.”20 Although international response was negative, the 
consideration of such a proposal shows its interest in a European army. 
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Germany is sending a clear signal to the UN about its foreign policy goals as well. 
The White Paper details Germany’s goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council: 
Germany will continue to help the UN adapt to increasingly complex tasks, in 
particular by… making steady progress towards the long-term goal of reforming 
the Security Council… Germany remains willing to assume greater responsibility 
as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council.21  
 
Germany has been seeking a permanent seat with veto power for over a decade. Germany 
believes its newfound status comes with a responsibility to change the international 
community. If they assume this responsibility, they expect to receive the legitimate power 
consummate with their financial and political efforts. After celebrating 25 years of 
reunification, a seat on the Security Council would be proof to the world and to Germans 
themselves of their international influence. The White Paper is the latest push for such a 
seat since 2011, when Chancellor Merkel reportedly traveled throughout Africa in an 
attempt to garner support for a German UN bid.22  
Germany’s relationship with NATO is more complex. One reason why Germany 
is so interested in the creation of a European army is fiscal considerations. The US has 
stated that in the coming years it will only provide 50% to each of NATO’s capabilities 
[via funding] in the future.23 As the US currently provides over 72% of total NATO 
spending, this leaves a large spending gap. President-elect Trump has openly called upon 
NATO to contribute more and even questioned US involvement with NATO in the first 
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place. The White Paper firmly and repeatedly commits itself to spending at least 2% of 
Germany’s GDP on Defense per year, which would nearly double its defense spending to 
74 billion dollars.24     
Also present is a German feeling that the US will continue to limit its influence in 
world security. The White Paper treats the subject lightly, but without the usual 
identifying of the US as a hegemon (benign or otherwise), the White Paper notes, 
“[p]olitically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a 
multipolar order.”25 More bluntly, the paper continues, “In this multipolar world, the 
United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy. 
In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in 
Europe, to take on more responsibility.”26 Traditional rhetoric around the US since the 
end of the Cold War has corroborated its place as the world hegemon. The fact that any 
doubt exists as to the absolute hegemony of the US represents a dramatic change in the 
nature of the international relations. In a time where Germany believes US influence is 
waning, Germany wants to grow and fill in the gap.  
Although the White Paper states repeatedly that the solidification, growth, and 
perpetuation of NATO is its goal, the White Paper troublingly encourages ad-hoc, bi and 
multi-lateral alliances, and other new formats of international cooperation. The paper 
claims, “new formats…do not affect the importance of established organizations. The 
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UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE will continue to provide the primary framework for 
our actions.”27 However, there is a duality in calling for the strengthening of international 
institutions like the UN, NATO, and the EU while at the same time explicitly opening 
Germany to informal formats such as the G7 and G20. 
 For example, the G7 is a format for the seven richest countries in the world to 
dialogue, problem solve, and reach agreements. However, these seven countries represent 
over 64% of the net global wealth.28 While far from perfect, the UN has checks and 
balances built into its charter to protect citizens of the world regardless of wealth or 
country. Even if the G7 has not acted in an exploitive manner, the informal format itself 
takes away influence from the rules-based UN. Although an initiative may be easier to 
achieve in an informal format, the appearance to smaller countries is that, “might makes 
right”; leaders must balance the time and effort cost of making decisions inside of the UN 
with the political cost of doing it through informal formats.  
 Although perhaps not realpolitik—that is, making decisions on practical rather 
than ideological considerations—the White Paper does not appreciate the severity of 
normalizing these formats, stating, “in cases where it can protect its interests in this way, 
[Germany] will participate in ad hoc cooperation and initiate it with its partners.”29 It 
may be impossible and impractical to ignore them, but official commitment to informal 
formats weakens the formal institutions maintaining the same, “rules-based international 
order on the basis of international law,” which Germany names as a security interest.30 
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The White Paper focuses on the short term at the expense of solid, long-term stability. 
The paper regrets erosion of international institutions while at the same time contributing 
to their decline. The SWP warned in 2014 that: 
The states of the West have contributed to weakening the existing architecture of 
global norms and institutions, whether by acting inconsistently or using double 
standards, by employing trade discrimination, or even by not sufficiently 
legitimizing the use of military force, by resorting to informal “coalitions of the 
willing” and ad-hoc formats such as the G-20, or simply by their failure to 
appropriately adapt the international order to the new challenges until now.31 
 
Germany appears to be hoping for the best, but planning for the worst. The White Paper 
reveals a fundamental belief that existing international institutions will become less 
significant in the future. However, the belief itself contributes to breakdown of the 
international institutions that brought relative peace to the last 70 years. If one believes 
these institutions are responsible for that peace, and Germany believes their influence to 
be in decline, the White Paper’s signals to potential rivals take on a new seriousness. 
Although obfuscated behind political terminology, the message is clear: “stay out 
of our way.” Germany, “too small for the world,” from a realist perspective is 
strengthening European ties to gain power. It is true that the EU has problems that will 
need solving with German leadership and resources. However, as mentioned before when 
comparing German vs European GDP to other regions of the world, maintaining their 
current level of influence will only be possible in the future with Europe’s backing.32 
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Germany is enhancing its alliance with the West to win power and influence in an 
anarchic world. However, Germany believes that if it takes too much of the spotlight, the 
plan will backfire as Europeans and Germans themselves will rebel and balance against 
too strong a Germany. Thus the policy of, “Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” The White Paper 
claims that, “[i]t is not might but right that creates lasting peace and stability,”33 and 
excepting its new commitment to informal formats, Germany has spent the last 25 years 
working within the rules-based international order to earn that right. Germany is now 
warning its challengers that any break from the status quo will not be acceptable.  
Germany is beyond just worrying about Russian expansionism. With the 
increased use of Hybrid Warfare in Crimea and the Ukraine, “Russia is creating 
uncertainty about the nature of its intentions.”34 If viewed again from a realist paradigm, 
in the absence of absolute US hegemony, Germany sees Russian as a competitor for the 
power given up by the US. 
Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its 
willingness to use force to advance its own interest and to unilaterally redraw 
borders…Russia is rejecting a close partnership with the West and placing 
emphasis on strategic rivalry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an 
independent power center with global ambitions.35  
 
The White Paper displays some extent of German exceptionalism, as while they 
write about Russian global ambition with disdain, just pages earlier they claim, 
“Germany has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order.”36 What 
is different is that Germany is attempting to assert itself globally through transparent, 
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rules based accepted forums like the EU, NATO, and the UN. Even the informal formats 
it participates in like the G20 are somewhat normalized in the international community. 
The message to Moscow is clear. Waning US power is leaving a global power vacuum 
that Germany intends to fill. 
Germany continues to give Russia the, “speak softly and carry a big stick,” 
treatment, by accusing Russia of creating a, “strategic rivalry.” Germany does not accept 
the rivalry, and instead insists it is a Russian construction. Germany thus does not commit 
itself to being Russia’s enemy, but is still flexing its muscles, arguing for, “the right 
balance between collective defence…on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative 
security and sectoral cooperation on the other.”37 
On first approach, German concerns about China seem to be purely based on 
economic might. The White Paper only explicitly mentions China twice in the White 
Paper, once in a list of the current UN Security Council. The second is because China, 
“could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will 
account for approximately one sixth.”38 However, more analysis reveals that Germany is 
less concerned about the rising Chinese economy, and instead about its military 
ambitions. 
Even if one analyzes the global economy as if it were a zero-sum game, Germany 
will continue to find itself in a strong economic position. Dr. Niblett, a British 
international relations expert said in a conference about the White Paper, “Germany is the 
world’s fourth largest economy…more important, it is structurally strong. In a country 
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like China, the number two in the world economy, I would not want to be sitting in 
Beijing trying to work out how to get China through its middle income trap. Will it face a 
great depression?”39 More important than arguing about the long-term stability of the 
Chinese market, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is the concrete structural 
strength of the German economy. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers points 
to unique strengths of the German manufacturing industry. Unlike other manufacturing 
countries with a small number of large companies—where the loss of one enterprise due 
to outsourcing is an incredible blow to the economy, Germany’s manufacturing base is 
mostly made of small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s), which dominate niche 
markets.40 More than 1,130 SME’s are either number one or two in the world market for 
their products, where, “superior quality and performance enables them to command 
premium prices.”41  
Although not explicitly, Germany’s White Paper reveals concern with Chinese 
naval presence in the South China Sea.  The paper mentions the importance of free and 
unimpeded trade routes for German economic success ten times in its one hundred and 
thirty-nine-pages, an average of once every fourteen pages.42 When listing the 7 missions 
of the Bundeswehr, the picture chosen for emphasis is that of three German naval ships 
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with the caption, “responsibility in matters of foreign and security policy – the security of 
our maritime routes is of great importance.”43  
The US is engaged in, “Freedom of Navigation Operations,”44 in the South China 
Sea in order to prioritize free-trade routes. Germany supports these as Germany wants, 
“to make clear that Beijing must uphold international law as it seeks a bigger global 
role.”45 By looking at Sino-German economic relations, it is easy to see why Germany 
avoids directly addressing these concerns in the White Paper. Approximately 20% of 
Chinese trade is with the EU, and, “Germany remains China’s principal trading partner in 
the European Union.”46 This bi-lateral partnership expands even beyond the economic, as 
in 2014, “[Sino-German] relations were upgraded to a ‘comprehensive strategic 
partnership.”47 Germany clearly feels uncomfortable berating a close partner in a 
comprehensive strategic document like the White Paper. Russia’s treatment has been 
harsher because Russia has officially claimed territory, whereas China has not yet 
attempted to exercise its “sovereignty” in the South China Sea with violence. 
 Although Germany’s official acceptance of informal formats, commitment to 
funding NATO, and stern strategic rhetoric on Russia are new, the most surprising and 
radical changes of German foreign policy concern “spoiler” states. Spoiler states are 
states that proliferate weapons of mass destruction, support or harbor terrorists, or are 
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fragile states in a strategic location, because, “in today’s globalized world, a local 
problem can quickly develop into a regional or international problem.”48 
 Previous White Papers cursorily mentioned intervention, stating that the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s, “abilities include the entire 
spectrum…including conflict prevention and conflict intervention,”49 and that regional 
conflicts could hurt Germany, such as the collapse of Yugoslavia, which, “could only be 
resolved through determined and unified intervention from the international 
community.”50 The new White Paper, however, specifies the need for future intervention. 
It bluntly states, “Germany must participate in the prevention and stabilization of crises 
and conflicts as well as in post-crisis and post-conflict management.”51 
As to how it will do so, the White Paper hedges its bets. It recommends, “robust 
military intervention,” and the maintenance of military means across, “all levels of 
intensity, from…humanitarian operations to robust peace enforcement [emphasis 
added].”52 The UN principles of peacekeeping operations define peace enforcement as 
interventions not requiring the consent of the main parties, but which may involve the use 
of military force at the strategic or international level.53 The difference between the two is 
both that of consent and that of extremes.  This is a signal that for the first time in its 
history, Germany may be willing to do more than training police forces and actively 
deploy troops into failing states. 
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 Further supporting this claim is the earmarking of funds for the Enhance and 
Enable Initiative (E2I) for the first time in 2016.54 E2I is primarily a way to, “export 
security beyond the external borders of the European Union,” in the context of training, 
education, and the provision of equipment.55 Chapter 3 considers E2I in depth, but its 
creation is a signal to fragile states that they can expect assistance, including arms 
exports, from Germany, even if the EU or other organizations deny them that assistance.  
 The White Paper repeatedly reiterates that an ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure, noting the high costs of foreign unemployment of young males, and 
stating, “[O]ur comprehensive approach will therefore place an even stronger focus on 
the labor market.”56 The White Paper also securitizes pandemics, taking them out of the 
medical realm and into the room of national security. Outbreaks in even small states have 
a possibility of growing into an pandemic which can affect the German population. The 
White Paper promises Germany’s commitment to organizations like the European 
Medical Corps and the World Health Organization.57 
The language of the White Paper is often left purposely obscure, for reasons that 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Other parts, however, are addressed bluntly 
and directly, and almost any nation, regardless of how it categorizes its relationship with 
Germany—friend and ally, rising power, or weak state—has information to glean from 
the 2016 White Paper.  Of course, signals are only as powerful as other state’s belief in 
them. Without legitimacy from Germany in the shape of concrete policy, money, and 
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domestic support, other countries cannot believe and act on the information Germany is 
sending.  
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Ambivalence of Domestic Support 
The Results of the Foreign Policy Review 2014 revealed the, “growing gulf 
between the expectation of Germany’s allies and partners that it take on a larger role in 
international politics and Germany’s self-imposed limitations on its foreign policy, which 
the German public largely favors.”1 Other experts noted, “The Federal Government is 
said to have long neglected to sufficiently seek the domestic support that is indispensable 
to dependable foreign policy.”2 Just as the 2016 White Paper is a signal to foreign 
governments, it is a signal to the people of Germany. Explicitly stated: 
The 2016 White Paper is the first of its kind to be based on an inclusive 
participation phase. National and international experts as well as interested citizens were 
given various opportunities to participate in the discussion about the future of German 
Security Policy...The White Paper is also an invitation and a request to actively continue 
the security policy debate following its publication, as security policy is a permanent 
endeavor for society as a whole in an open and healthy democracy.3 
 
In this sense, however, the White Paper is at odds with itself. The German 
Government produced an animation titled Explained through video: The 2016 White 
Paper.4 At four minutes, the animation is just long enough to become condescending 
with its non-stop cartoon sound effects, while short enough to appear simplistic. This 
video distills meaning to the lowest common denominator, while the White Paper is 
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actually often written in legal language with highly specific meaning behind it. Citing and 
conflating three different constitutional articles, one section of the White Paper explains 
constitutional authority in deploying the Bundeswehr inside Germany.5 Chapter Two of 
this study explained the significance of “robust peace enforcement” which is a benign 
term with huge implications.  
There is no perfect balance between the two. Public outreach will always either be 
too complicated as to be accessible, or too simplified to be meaningful. What is important 
to recognize, however, is that the time for public input on the White Paper is closed. The 
Government is no longer inviting debate on the topic but attempting to drive political 
opinion to support the White Paper’s policies.  
The German Government has had moderate success in changing public opinion to 
support its foreign policy initiatives, but when it comes time to follow through on hard 
choices, public support dwindles. This is evident in the recruitment crisis facing the 
Bundeswehr and in public opinion on Russia and the Ukraine crisis.  However, because 
the public was heavily involved in the creation of the White Paper and polls reflect their 
consent for the broad objectives, it is now the responsibility of the German Government 
to execute its strategy even if the public does not agree on all specific issues.  
Public Opinion about increasing German influence was initially low. During 
Frank Steimer’s “Review 2014—A Fresh Look at Foreign Policy” a poll from the 
Koerber Foundation found that 60% of Germans believed, “Germany should continue to 
exercise [international] restraint.”6 The review broke down foreign involvement into 
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categories and attempted to argue that Germans only disagreed with military 
involvement. This was partially true, but only a minority of Germans supported taking in 
refugees or supporting other countries’ military interventions (even without direct 
military participation). 82% wanted decreased engagement in military operations, the 
same number who wanted to decrease the amount of arms supplied to allied countries.7 
Much can change in two years. An updated 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center 
found that today 53% of Germans believe their country should help other countries deal 
with their problems.8 While the exact same question was not asked, in the 2014 Koerber 
Foundation Polls only 37% of Germans thought Germany should be more engaged. 74% 
believe that the EU should play a more active role in world affairs than it does today and 
62% think human rights should be one of Germany’s most important foreign policy 
goals. Another large success has been Germany’s approach to leadership, as 67% of 
Germans think that, “in foreign policy, our country should take allies’ interests into 
account even if it means compromising.”9 The German people strongly support 
“Fuehrung aus der Mitte.” In these terms, the White Paper seems to fit with popular 
opinion. 
The German government drove this radical two-year change in German 
perspective. The outreach began concurrently with the Koerber polls as part of the same 
2014 review. One third of the entire project focused on engaging debate with domestic 
Germany. Beginning in July of 2014, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) held over 60 
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forums, panel debates, conferences, and simulation workshops.10 The FFO claims to have 
succeeded in institutionally learning not, “[to] simply make difficult decisions in cabinet 
meetings and then announce them on the news: Instead, we need to campaign for our 
convictions and share the content of our decision at many events.”11  
Even though the 2014 Review is over, the webpage has been specifically archived 
so that its lessons will not be forgotten.12 Another lesson learned was the importance of 
online engagement, which has led to a continuation of clear, user-friendly websites for all 
major German Foreign Policy Initiatives.13  
The 2016 White Paper website is detailed and clearly organized into 11 sections; 
these include a “dialogue” page with reactions from 53 everyday citizens, experts in 
videos breaking down “questions about the White Paper”, and a download page with 
links to various literature surrounding German Foreign Policy.  
The conversation about the White Paper has finished, and the updated public 
foreign policy debate currently revolves around “Peace Lab 2016.” Peace Lab 2016 is a 
format that began on the 5th of July (just days after the release of the White Paper) 
seeking public opinion on the government’s attempt, “[to] establish new guidelines for 
managing crises and conflicts by the spring of 2017.”14 In the same fashion as the 2014 
Review and the 2016 White Paper, Peace Lab 2016 summarizes debates and forums on 
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various topics surrounding crisis management, with a twitter account used to announce 
upcoming events. 
In contrast to earlier attempts, however, there is not a dedicated forum for Internet 
discussion. Instead, Peace Lab 2016, “heartily invites you to take part in this discussion: 
share or comment on this discussion on Facebook, LinkedIn or Twitter! If you have your 
own idea for a discussion, please tell us via our email!”15 This is an attempt to reach a 
wider, broader, and younger audience than in previous endeavors. Without a dedicated 
space in which only the political engaged will talk, it must be shared on social media, and 
should theoretically be read and discussed by a much larger number of people. It is not 
possible to divine causation from correlation, and increased German support for 
international engagement may have come from any number of sources. However, the 
public outreach performed by the German Government appears to have been at least 
moderately successful, and was certainly not a failure. 
The German Government, however, was less successful in turning broad support 
for its strategy into support for concrete action. The largest disconnects in which the 
public disagrees with the White Paper strategy relate to the Bundeswehr and the 
Ukrainian Crisis. Despite the White Paper’s promise to raise military funding from 1.2% 
to 2% of Germany’s GDP, only 34% of Germans support increasing defense spending, 
whereas 64% support keeping it the same or even reducing it.  The German Government 
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is listening, as the planned defense budget for 2020 remains the same as its 2016 levels.16 
85% of Germans believe ISIS is a “major threat” to Germany, but only 29% believe using 
military force is the best way to defeat terrorism.  
More important than polling numbers about Germany’s political will to fight or 
properly fund its military is its ability to field soldiers. Regardless of public opinion on 
foreign policy, unless Germany has the personnel to effect change in its environment, 
none of its opinions matter. After the end of mandatory military service five years ago, 
Germany is still struggling to recruit members. Attempts by the German Government to 
increase recruiting have failed, mostly because of bad public perception of the 
Bundeswehr. The White Paper tells us that:  
The people in this country recognize the importance of our citizens in 
uniform. They rely on them, they are grateful, and they feel connected to 
them. Their interest in them is sincere. This is expressed in a multitude of 
respectful gestures and words. Surveys have shown that a growing 
majority of Germans highly regard and trust the Bundeswehr. Not least of 
all the positive response at public events such as the Bundeswehr Day has 
shown that the Bundeswehr is firmly embedded in society.17  
 
Interestingly, on the same page of the White Paper, there is a photo of a worker 
scraping paint off the entrance to the Bundeswehr recruiting station in Berlin. The front 
entrance was paint bombed in blue and red as an act of vandalism and protest in 
November of 2015.18 The juxtaposition of a paragraph explaining the public support of 
the Bundeswehr with a picture of a vandalized recruiting center does not seem to fit.  
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Alison Smale of the New York Times determined that in 2024, 17% of male 
Germans born in 2006 will need to volunteer to serve in the Bundeswehr.19 Less than 
700,000 children will come of age in 2024, and half are girls, seven times less likely to 
serve than their male peers. The Defence Minister’s annual goal is 60,000 applicants.  In 
2012, one year after conscription ended, the Bundeswehr already missed its target of 
volunteers by 37.7%.20  
The White Paper acknowledges this problem and will attempt to make the 
military more attractive by creating modern accommodations, flexible working 
conditions, childcare arrangements, state of the art IT equipment, and improved pay and 
social security for service members.21 A second idea proposed by the German 
government was the creation of “Bundeswehr Day” (Tag der Bundeswehr). As the 
aviation website Checksix noted during their coverage of the Luftwaffe’s demonstration 
during Bundeswehr Day, “In the past, the primary concern of the Bundeswehr was 
demonstrating its equipment and capabilities, nowadays however, its main concern is 
attracting new recruits voluntarily into its ranks.”22 Ironically, however, Robert Kysela 
notes in his review of the airshow that although the day was a, “great success!”, 
unfortunately, “this event was definitely no airshow as the Bundeswehr generally do not 
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like to attract a lot of attention and as such the demonstrations were generally quite 
restrained.”23 
Even in the midst of a recruitment crisis, on a day meant to make the military 
cool, the Bundeswehr did not feel comfortable showing off. In the view of the current 
public, the Bundeswehr should be seen and not heard, and is not seen as a desirable place 
to work.  
The 2016 White Paper mentions one last strategy to increase recruitment of the 
Bundeswehr, this time without the need to increase public opinion. A Bundeswehr open 
to all citizens of the EU. This idea is mentioned only once throughout the whitepaper, and 
hidden inside of a paragraph, rather than highlighted as a bullet point. At the bottom of 
the seven-sentence paragraph, the White Paper states, “Last but not least, opening up the 
Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU would not only offer potential for wide-ranging 
integration and regeneration and thus strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it 
would also send out a strong signal for a European approach.”24 
Limited public response to this idea has been decidedly negative. The German 
Newspaper Deutsche Welle reported on the proposal and notes that the Bundestag would 
have to change the German Military Act. Political opposition to this is already mounting, 
such as from MP Alexander Neu who complained that most recruits will come from 
economically weak countries, a population he does not want to give access to Germany.25 
Secondly, European Partners need to be consulted and in many cases special agreements 
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made. Finally, the German Armed Forces Association, which represents the interest of 
over 200,000 current and former soldiers made it clear that they would not be quick to 
give their approval, as questions like loyalty to Germany first need consideration.26 There 
has been no policy initiative aimed at realizing this idea. It appears that at least for now, 
the idea is tabled as it was received with a soft but firm “no” from the public.   
The German Public slowly accepted Germany’s increased role on the 
international playing field, but has not been as receptive in actually supporting the 
Bundeswehr. Another area of foreign policy citizens resist is the White Paper’s take on 
Russia. Although 62% of Germans think human rights should supersede other foreign 
policy goals, according the Human Rights Watch, “Russian authorities have created a 
pervasive climate of fear and repression in Crimea in the two years since it has occupied 
the peninsula,” yet Germans still do not support their government’s sanctioning of Russia 
in reaction to the Ukrainian crisis.27  
Only 31% of Germans see Russia as a threat to their country, and 58% of 
Germans think, “having a strong economic relationship with Russia is more important 
than being tough on Russia with foreign policy disputes.” In a 2015 poll, 77% of 
Germans opposed sending arms to Ukraine.28   While this may seem surprising to the 
                                                          
26 "Zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands." Zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands. Accessed November 02, 
2016. https://www.dbwv.de/C12574E8003E04C8/CurrentBaseLink/W2AF9G43081DBWNDE. 
27 "Ukraine: Fear, Repression in Crimea." Human Rights Watch. March 18, 2016. Accessed October 27, 
2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/18/ukraine-fear-repression-crimea. 
28 Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, 
but 
Reluctant to Provide Military Aid." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. June 10, 2015. 
Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-
ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/. 
36 
 
uninitiated, it makes sense when one considers the political, cultural, and economic ties 
Germany has with Russia.   
Many officials “spent decades” working with Moscow during German 
reunification, and business leaders have much to gain and lose in gas supplies and export 
markets.29 The Pew Research Center supports these findings, as only 26% of those living 
in West Germany support decreasing the economic sanctions on Russia, while 42% of 
East Germans support decreasing the sanctions.30 Even among the Ukrainian Crisis, plans 
to expand the Nord Stream gas pipeline from Russia to northern Germany have not 
slowed down.  
The Nord Stream 2 would bypass Ukraine, and possibly deprive them of almost 2 
billion USD per year.31  Ukraine already needed a bailout from the International 
Monetary Fund in September of 2016.32 Germany is clearly stuck between its values of 
promoting human rights and international stability, and its own economic interests. 
Berlin, so quick to compromise on issues with its allies, needs to remember that it cannot 
do the same with its rivals. As implied by the title of the report, Germany should heed the 
advice of “New Power, New Responsibility” when it notes: 
What is true is that conflicts between German values and interest, 
especially in dealing with authoritarian states, are often unavoidable in the 
short term and that they must be balanced from case to case. In the long-
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term, however, a commitment to values is an existential interest for any 
Western democracy.33 
 
 As much as domestic support is important in creating a foreign policy strategy, it 
is actions, which demonstrate credibility to the international world. It is time for the 
Chancellery, whose, “instinct is against running much ahead of German opinion,” to 
begin creating public opinion instead of following it.34  
Broad public support was essential in creating the 2016 White Paper. However, 
the administration may have learned its lessons too well: detailed engagement with the 
German public as educational outreach is important; and it is also correct that one of the 
best ways to educate the public is by engaging in large scale Socratic seminars and 
guided discussions. However, it is time to stop offering debates to the public when with 
the explicit purpose of informing and not in contributing to writing new policy. Public 
support was already gathered to write the White Paper, now it is time to implement it. 
There will always be critics, and the best way to silence them is not to debate them but to 
show them they are wrong. PeaceLab2016 has produced over 1300 tweets since April of 
2016 and yet has only 343 followers.35 The public has a much lower attention span when 
discussing how Germany intervenes compared to discussing when or if it should 
intervene in the first place.  
The German public consented to the White Book, and now it is time follow 
through on what was written. As mentioned earlier, the German Governments believe in 
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foreign policy “broadly rooted in society.”36 The white paper has rooted such support, 
and now the government needs to begin the growth process.  If it fails to fund or supply 
the German Military with enough soldiers, or follow through on its rhetoric and strategy 
of remaining tough on Russia, the White Paper will have been written for nothing. 
Germany has gathered as much public support as it could have hoped for, now it is time 
to leverage that support into action. As discussed in Chapter 2, the White Paper was a 
signal to the international world, but actions will always speak louder than words.  
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International Reactions to the White Paper 
 
 While the German White Paper is less than six months old, the international community 
has already responded. Russia, the European Union, and the United States have had the strongest 
and most important of these reactions. Russia responded scathingly, denying Germany’s 
accusations of being a spoiler in the international system, and accused Germany of remilitarizing 
in order to dominate its neighbors yet again. The EU responded mildly positively, with great 
support from the political elite and a general non-reaction from its citizens. US support has been 
overwhelming, with calls for Germany to actually go further and take on more responsibility 
than it already has. Although the Russian response is both troubling and important, for the most 
part Germany has done an excellent job marketing itself and its interests to the international 
community and is in a good position to achieve those aims. 
 Russia is gaining a negative reputation for the high volume of propaganda it releases 
online, and pro-Russian internet activists have earned themselves the nickname “Putin’s Trolls”, 
“Numerous examples of highly biased and propagandist coverage of international affairs by the 
Russian media have often been highlighted by well-respected commentators, experts, and 
journalists”.1 One of the most influential outlets is Russia Today, a television channel and 
Internet news-source. Russia Today, rebranded as RT, claims to, “create news with an edge for 
viewers who Question More [SIC].”2 However, while becoming more informed is almost always 
a good idea, the Columbia Journalism Review notes that RT is, “known as an extension of former 
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President Vladimir Putin’s confrontational foreign policy.”3 It is highly provocative, relies upon 
questionable experts and sources, and presents only one side of the issues. However, sorting 
through RT’s bias opens an opportunity to understand what the Russian Political Elite wants 
people to believe, and therefore their opinion of international affairs. 
  RT wrote a reactionary response to the German White Paper, titled “Germany moves to 
run its own EU Army -- leaving both Brussels & NATO in new crisis.”4 The article builds a 
narrative that a race between the EU and Germany to build a European army for purposes of 
political prestige is splitting NATO and making it less cohesive. The author compares the third 
Reich the rise of the alternative Right, then argues, “it’s a stark choice between a German 
chancellor running such an ambitious military operation or the rather ineffective EU diplomat 
Federica Mogherini, who has struggled to achieve even the most fledgling success.”5 Russia is 
disappointed that their almost belligerent behavior has been brought to light in such an important 
document. Their hopefulness that a stronger German military or European Army might actually 
weaken the European position reveals a fear that such a program will be successful. 
Several Russian political figures have also made their disappointment clear. An 
authorless RT article cites two members, one from the upper and one from the lower chamber of 
the Russian Duma. Both go on the offensive, such as when Alexey Pushkov claimed the harsh 
language used in the White Paper is, “more a sign of Berlin’s ‘subordination’ to the US than a 
demonstration of ‘the real state of affairs.”6 Konstantin Kosachev from the upper chamber 
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responded less aggressively, and merely insists, “Moscow has never abandoned cooperation and 
partnership with the West…it’s not Russia who withdrew from cooperation with NATO.”7 They 
both make the US and the West responsible, without responding the White Paper’s claims. 
The most direct response has been from the spokeswoman from the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, Maria Zakharova, who claimed, “[r]emarks mentioned in the doctrine on the need to 
cooperate with Russia in the sphere of common interests do not cancel the fact that by approving 
the White Paper, Berlin is cementing a confrontational component of its entire policy in regard to 
Russia in the long term.”8 Again, instead of acknowledging the actions Russia is accused of, the 
foreign policy talking point is to shift the blame from the Russian government to the accuser. 
Berlin is not going to change the strategy document it spent two years writing because of a 
negative Russian response, so the Kremlin’s posturing is most likely for the benefit of Russian 
citizens.  The posturing continued as the diplomat ominously ended her comments noting, 
"Berlin’s another [SIC] anti-Russian insinuation cannot but arouse regret and we will take it into 
consideration in the aspect of Russian-German relations."9 By doubling down on its “strategic 
rivalry”, Russia can put the onus on the West, and scapegoat the US to Russian citizens for the 
sanctions placed upon them. This is even easier given the pro-Russia leanings of former DDR 
citizens mentioned in Chapter 3, which gives Russia the ease of pointing out support from 
abroad.10 Further analysis of domestic Russia is beyond the scope of this paper, but noteworthy 
is that the nature of these decentralized accusations of the West through online propaganda sites 
does not necessarily reveal Russian confidence, but fear of increased Western power.  
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Other member states of the European Union responded generally positively to the 
German White Paper, with some exceptions. While there has not been a plethora of official 
responses from EU states, the response to the German White Paper can be benchmarked by 
looking at support for a European-wide Army, especially one in which Germany takes the lead. 
While support for such an army cannot be directly correlated with individual points of the White 
Paper, the detailed requirements for creating such a European Army are indeed all major themes 
of the German White Paper, including increased European cooperation, increased military 
spending, and a general wish for more European Influence in international affairs.  
The UK is one of the only states that has not and does not want increased European 
integration – not only militarily but, as Brexit shows, in other domains too. When the German 
White Paper was first leaked in a Financial Times article, Brexit leaders immediately took issue 
with it. Mike Hookem, member of the European parliament and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party, claimed the EU would force the UK into joining its Army saying, “David 
Cameron and the traditional parties have neither the political will nor clout in Europe to defend 
our armed forces from becoming one part of a far-reaching European military structure.”11  With 
the impending Brexit, only 2% of British MEPs supported more integration in defense policy, 
placing them second to last in European support, ahead of only Ireland.  
However, because after the UK leaves, they will no longer be able to veto or even vote 
against increased integration, “from the perspective of the CSDP [Common Security and 
Defence Policy], Brexit is actually a positive development,” according to Eva Chitul and Doru 
Frantescu.12 In order to, “inject new Momentum,” and, “relaunch the European project,” all 27 
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current EU members except for the UK met in Bratislava for a one day meeting in September, 
during which Italy called for a joint permanent European Multinational Force (EMF).13 This was 
unexpected and was an expansion of the proposal jointly made by Germany and France, which 
called only for the establishment of a permanent EU headquarters.14 High levels of support came 
from Germany, Italy, Spain, and although French MEP’s were more divided on the issue, they 
were one of the two countries to initiate the conversation.  
The highest levels of support came from, “former Russian satellite states in Eastern 
Europe,” like Romania.15 This can be explained using Stephen Walt’s balance-of-power theory 
that argues that these states are “Balancing” against Russia, which they see as a rising power.16 
Besides bad experiences with the former Soviet Union: 
To ally with the dominant power means placing one’s trust in its continued benevolence. 
The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order 
to avoid being dominated by those who can.17   
 
eastern European states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania support further integration with a vote 
of at least 70%.18 They are watching international developments keenly, and because Russia has 
already shown its willingness to “dominate its allies” - as shown by its actions in Georgia and the 
Ukraine, these states feel that it is in their best interest to integrate into the European Union.   
The least amount of support for a European Army came from traditionally neutral states: 
mainly the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria. However, because MEPs do 
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not vote by nations and instead group themselves independently into coalitions, there is still 
some support in nations like Austria. In fact, when support for a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO), rather than the EMF is examined, only five of the twenty-eight EU 
members do not demonstrate majority support for increased defense policy integration (e.g. joint 
headquarters) within the European Parliament. While PESCO does not go as far as a standing 
EMF, it still demonstrates a marked increase in European security Cooperation, and therefore 
serves as a positive benchmark for the German White Paper.  
Most importantly, support for a more deeply integrated Europe is trending upwards. The 
election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States spurred a new wave of talks. 
German defense minister Ursula von der Leyen claimed that President-elect Trump’s victory has 
“cast doubt” on NATOs mutual defense pact; a view echoed by Jean-Claude Juncker, president 
of the European Commission.19 Juncker, while not specifying the US-election, held a press 
conference the day after the election results were announced, saying that US-EU relations 
shouldn’t be reset, “out of anger,” and declaring, “We have a lot to thank the American’s for… 
but they won’t look after Europe’s security forever.”20 In the wake of the election, there was an 
impromptu session held in Brussels for the Heads of States to talk. While the UK and Hungary 
did not attend, and France sent only an envoy, enough members were present to sign off on a 
new defense plan, which allows the EU to deploy forces to stabilize a crisis before a UN 
resolution is passed.21 While the meeting “played down” talk of a European Army, many state 
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officials offered commentary similar to the French Foreign Minister, who called it an, “essential 
step forward.”22 Being only a step forward, future projects can be expected as well. 
An essential caveat to this willingness to integrate European Security is that the support 
for these initiatives came from the “political elite,” specifically the Members of the European 
Parliament. Support from citizens is generally much lower. Sputnik news, a Russian media 
outlet, claimed last year that 36% of Germans and 37% of French would rather have an EU army 
to protect Europe than have NATO fulfill that role.23 It is important to note that the Russian 
outlet (which publishes sensationalist articles with titles like “Washington Wants Bloodshed in 
Aleppo to Continue”) has incentive to over-report the number of EU citizens calling for a 
European army (the “end of NATO “) to show the “divide” between Europe and the US.24 
However, even from a biased source, only a minority of European citizens support such a 
measure. As seen in the previous chapter, there is a disconnect between the politicians making 
foreign policy decisions and their domestic base of support.  Whether or not the support gap 
applies to Germany’s new White Paper or only to a European army is much more difficult to 
determine; but a lack of protest against the new German White Paper and recent defense 
proposals signals, “No news is good news.” Even if it is the case that the average EU citizens 
merely doesn’t care about Germany’s re-militarization, the lack of concern after Germany’s 
instigation of two World-Wars is telling in itself. 
The last major actor whose reaction should be considered is the US. Although, like in 
Europe, the White Paper has, “received limited attention in the Anglophone media,”25 unlike the 
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haltingly positive European response, US Foreign Policy experts overwhelmingly support the 
new German Strategy. Jeffrey Rathke, Senior Fellow for the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, notes that the White Paper gives Germany a central role, “which in the 
uncertain times facing U.S. security… is a bright spot from an American perspective.”26 
Contrary to European Opinion, Rathke feels that the White Paper does not goes far enough. He 
points out that it self-describes Germany as a, “middle-sized power,” which he feels is, “a 
frustratingly false modesty… and unnecessarily self-limiting.”27 Alison Smale of the New York 
Times also embodies the positive American reaction in an article titled “In a Reversal, 
Germany’s Military Growth is Met With Western Relief.”28 Concerns about German re-
militarization and strength, very real just 25 years after German Reunification, have completely 
disappeared. In fact, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies hosted an almost 
celebratory “Roll-Out Event” for the White Paper, including panels and networking 
opportunities.29 
Americans seem to be happy with the White Paper’s aims, even if they don’t know of its 
existence. Both President Obama and President-elect Trump have complained of other NATO 
members acting as “free-riders.”30 Whether America wants to become more isolationist or, on 
the contrary, strengthen ties with our partners, more activity and enthusiasm from another state 
with similar goals and interests is a positive event.  
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29 http://www.aicgs.org/events/white-paper-on-german-security-policy-and-the-future-of-the-bundeswehr/ 
30 Kessler, Glenn. "Trump’s Claim That the U.S. Pays the ‘lion’s Share’ for NATO." Washington Post. March 30, 
2016. Accessed November 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/03/30/trumps-
claim-that-the-u-s-pays-the-lions-share-for-nato/. 
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In general, the international reaction to the White Paper was almost entirely a success. No 
foreign state outside of Russia is concerned about increased German hard power. Germany has 
successfully built trust and cohesion over the last quarter century to the point where it is a valued 
player in the western democratic order. In fact, many of Germany’s allies are excited by the 
country’s remilitarization and wish it were even more involved. The two countries expressing 
displeasure at Germany’s updated strategy are Russia and the UK. Russia, acting as a spoiler 
state even before the new document was released, seems unlikely to halt its behavior, regardless 
of whether Germany chooses to become a lion or a sheep. The UK has fears that Germany and 
the EU will bypass NATO, but because it will soon no longer be able to block European 
integration, Germany is in an excellent position to achieve its foreign policy goals, and 
specifically its military integrationist plans, within the international community.  
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The Way Forward: Obstacles to implementation of 
the White Paper 
 
Germany’s successful implementation of the White Paper faces three problems: 
Russia’s propaganda disrupts German discourse; unfavorable results of the upcoming 
federal election could seriously obstruct the White Paper’s chances of implementation; 
and the European Union continues to fracture. For a successful implementation of the 
White Paper, the German government will firstly need to decrease the Russian media’s 
influence on Germany’s citizens. Second, the political leaders who created the White 
Paper will need to remain in power, with their re-election serving as a mandate by the 
German people to continue down the path of increased international involvement. 
Finally, the European Union must remain cohesive, especially on issues such as the 
refugee and debt crises.  Germany will have to “lead from the center” and stabilize the 
EU by reaching out publically, fiscally, and militarily. Because of the shift towards 
Euroskepticism among the German electorate, solutions to the last two problems are 
somewhat incompatible.  Chancellor Merkel needs to work for the EU to keep the region 
stable, while convincing the German people she cares about Germany first.   
On the face of it, the Russian propaganda network is an amazing accomplishment. 
The German White Paper only identifies propaganda within a framework of hybrid 
warfare, noting that, “[h]ybrid attacks can target all areas of society through cyber-attacks 
and information operations (e.g. propaganda) … to delay or completely prevent an 
immediate and decisive response by the state under attack.”1 In listing ways to counter 
                                                          
1 Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper On German Security Policy and The Future Of The 
Bundeswehr. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 201, 39 
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the information warfare aspect, the White Paper recommends an effective early-warning 
system, and calls upon politicians, the media, and society at large to expose propaganda 
and counter it with facts.2  
 For contrast, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 does not consider 
propaganda as a means within a framework, but an end in itself. The Concept explicitly 
declares, “[Russia] must ‘create instruments for influencing how it is perceived in the 
world’, ‘develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion 
abroad’, and ‘counteract information threats to its sovereignty and security.’”3 Germany 
sees information warfare as a subset of hybrid warfare, but because Russia sees it as 
important in its own right, “[t]he ability to project narratives to foreign audiences 
is…considered a matter of national security.”4 While Germany has identified information 
operations in a strategic context for the first time in the White Paper, Russia has spent the 
last decade developing these capabilities. As long as Russia can project and control 
narratives outside of its borders, Germany needs to create effective counters, lest it and 
the EU be susceptible to artificial division and declining social capital. Essentially, 
Russian propaganda will cause confusion, polarize the German people, and disrupt nay 
policy consensus that may be possible. 
Russia’s “war on information” is not new. In 2014, a law restricting foreign 
ownership and management control of media outlets ousted CNN and BBC from Russian 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 Russian Foreign Ministry (2013) Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 12 February (as 
cited in Hutchings, Stephen, and Joanna Szostek. "Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media 
Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis." E-International Relations. April 29, 2015. Accessed November 26, 
2016. http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/28/dominant-narratives-in-russian-political-and-media-discourse-
during-the-crisis /.) 
4 Ibid. 
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airwaves. In short, Russia successful centralized its news.5 Most troublesome, however, 
is their exportation of propaganda to other countries, briefly mentioned in Chapter Four.6  
 Germany needs to continue supporting and promoting free Internet at home and 
abroad. Politicians should utilize twitter and other media to connect directly to the 
German people and denounce specific Russian propaganda efforts. For example, an 
anonymous spokeswoman from the German interior ministry told the right-wing 
newspaper Welt am Sonntag that turning back all refugee boats was, “what the minister 
believes.”7 Dozens of articles from outlets like the Express, Daily Mail, and Independent 
buried the original article8 within 24 hours with sensational headlines like “'DON'T 
COME HERE!' Merkel migrant U-turn as Germany orders EU to SEND BACK boats to 
Africa” without reaching out for comment and often citing no sources at all.9  The 
original article is almost impossible to find, both because so many other sensational 
outlets show up first on Google, and because it is in German. The English-language 
outlets do not link to it, if they mention the original article at all. The German 
Government should issue a direct but proportional response, perhaps via tweet or other 
social media, immediately both clarifying the situation and pointing out the poor 
journalism.  
                                                          
5 Armstrong, Matt. "Russia's War on Information." War on the Rocks. August 10, 2015. Accessed 
November 26, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/russias-war-on-information/. 
6 Refer to “Putin’s Trolls”, Page 40 
7 "Germany's Interior Ministry Floats Hardline 'Australian-style' Asylum Policy." DW.COM. November 6, 
2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-interior-ministry-floats-hardline-
australian-style-asylum-policy/a-36280996. 
8 "Ankuendigung Der Abschiebung Soll Abgeschafft Werden." Welt.de. November 7, 2016. Accessed 
November 25, 2016. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/video159329152/Ankuendigung-der-
Abschiebung-soll-abgeschafft-werden.html. 
9 Gutteridge, Nick. "'DON'T COME HERE!' Merkel Migrant U-turn as Germany Orders EU to SEND 
BACK Boats to Africa." Express.co.uk. November 07, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. 
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/729402/Migrant-crisis-Angela-Merkel-refugee-Germany-tougher-
asylum-smugglers-Mediterranean. 
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According to Hans-Georg Maassen, chief of the Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution, “We have the impression that [information manipulation] is part of a 
hybrid threat that seeks to influence public opinion and the decision making process.”10  
Angela Merkel also recently warned the public, “We are already, even now, having to 
deal with [false] information out of Russia… it may be that this could also play a role 
during the election campaign.”11 Other members of the German government must follow 
suit in denouncing foreign influence in their domestic sphere. 
The way to counter Russian propaganda abroad is by reporting concrete and 
accessible facts. In a parallel to another age, successful Western propaganda in the USSR 
was not propaganda at all—but regular America media. When Soviet theaters showed 
The Grapes of Wrath to display the, “desperate misery of the Okies under the most 
advanced system of capitalism on the planet,” it backfired. The USSR pulled the film 
after, “Soviet audiences...could see for themselves that even the most dispossessed of 
America’s rural proletariat were shown driving automobiles.”12 The key is not to present 
an alternative opinion against which Russian media outlets can argue, but to utilize 
twenty-first-century technology to spread unbiased facts and let people independently 
form their own opinion based upon them.  
                                                          
10 Gramer, Robbie. "Can We Interest You in Yet Another Russian Election Interference Story?" Foreign 
Policy. November 16, 2016. Accessed November 30, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/can-we-
interest-you-in-yet-another-russian-election-interference-russia-germany-merkel-intelligence-putin/. 
11 "Merkel Warns of Russian Cyber Attacks in German Elections." DW.COM. November 8, 2016. 
Accessed November 26, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-warns-of-russian-cyber-attacks-in-german-
elections/a-36314197. 
12 Stephen J. Whitfield, « Projecting Politics: The Grapes of Wrath », Revue LISA/LISA e-journal [En 
ligne], Vol. VII –n°1 | 2009, mis en ligne le 22 juillet 2009, consulté le 26 novembre 2016. URL : 
http://lisa.revues.org/802 ; DOI : 10.4000/lisa.802 
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Matt Armstrong, Governor of the non-governmental organization Broadcasting 
Board of Governors, recommends creating Russian-language TV programs in the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, and digital offerings that reach millions of Russians 
and Russian-speakers.13 Germany should focus on online platforms, with the purpose of 
reaching German citizens most likely to be sympathetic to Russia. The lessons it learned 
during its public outreach to create the 2016 White Paper and subsequent foreign policy 
initiatives like PeaceLab2016 should be applied to counter Russian disinformation. While 
online and cable outlets reach the entire country, dialogues and in person outreach should 
focus on the eastern parts of Germany, which are more likely to be sympathetic to 
Russia.14  
Kristine Berzina of the German Marshall Fund claims that regardless of promises 
between President-elect Trump and President Putin, we should not expect a reconciliation 
between Russia and the West anytime soon. But she emphasizes that even if the sanctions 
should continue, there is no guarantee they will succeed. 
 The situation is analogous to the time when OPEC created an artificial shortage 
of oil to keep prices high during the 1973 Oil Crisis. However, long-term efforts of 
countries to create fuel-efficient engines use alternative resources such as natural gas, and 
import from other countries defeated the short-term strategy. Berzina believes that Russia 
is similarly changing its economy in reaction to sanctions. She notes that in the absence 
of western food imports, she has seen an increase in local stores and locally made goods. 
                                                          
13 Armstrong, Matt. "Russia's War on Information". 
14 Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, 
but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. June 10, 
2015. Accessed November 03, 2016. http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/nato-publics-blame-russia-for-
ukrainian-crisis-but-reluctant-to-provide-military-aid/. 
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In essence, “Russian citizens have adapted to their new circumstances.”15 The sanctions 
hit Russia hard, and although Russia’s citizens still suffer the consequences, they have 
already weathered the shock. If sanctions are the new normal, they no longer elicit a 
reaction. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes, “over-reliance on 
sanctions in dealing with Russia risks undercutting their effectiveness over the medium to 
long term as the Kremlin inexorably develops mechanisms to evade sanctions or at a 
minimum seeks to soften their impact.”16 
One of the only ways to combat hybrid warfare, in which countries engage in 
salami tactics by pushing established boundaries without overtly crossing them, is to call 
out the offender and draw a clear line. But doing this can be dangerous, because if the 
other state does not believe that the lines are firm, they will cross them and incite a war.  
Even more dangerous is engaging in modern day appeasement and letting up 
against Russia.  Just as Germany is and was willing to make economic and political 
sacrifices to keep the EU intact, they must make similar sacrifices to continue Russia’s 
isolation: starting with the cancelation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.  
Germany must call a spade a spade as, “The Kremlin has no intention of being a 
reliable partner, and the West should embrace this strategic clarity.”17 Russia will 
continue to exploit the duality in Germany’s plan of, “credible deterrence with a 
                                                          
15 Berzina, Kristine. "Sorry West, Russia's Just Not That Into You: Preparing for Long-Term 
Estrangement." The German Marshall Fund of the United States. October 24, 2016. Accessed November 
26, 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/10/24/sorry-west-russias-just-not-you-preparing-long-term-
estrangement. 
16 Weiss, Andrew S., and Richard Nephew. "The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-Russian Relations." Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. July 11, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/11/role-of-sanctions-in-u.s.-russian-relations-pub-64056. 
17 Berzina, Kristine. "Sorry West, Russia's Just Not That Into You: Preparing for Long-Term 
Estrangement." 
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willingness to engage in dialogue” until Germany explicitly breaks ties with Russia. 
Furthermore, Russia will continue to spread misinformation inside, creating artificial 
division inside of Germany.   
The second precondition for success of the White Paper is the continued reign of 
like-minded political leaders who agree on the strategy. This is an obvious assumption, 
but Germany is in the middle of a political upset, which may have stark repercussions for 
its foreign policy. The new populist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), has not 
published a cohesive platform related to foreign policy. However, it sums up their 
response to the new strategic paper as, “The new White Paper is no masterpiece; it leads 
the military in the wrong direction.”18 Since the AfD is primarily an opposition to the 
ruling German party coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD, it would probably reject any White 
Paper on principle, but the AfD is also known for its Euroskepticism. Even after its 
Euroskeptic founder Bernd Luke left to form another party, their website still claims, 
“The AfD is convinced of the principle of subsidiarity, and rejects the countless attempts 
by the EU commission to interfere in the everyday life of its citizens.”19  
In Berlin’s September 2016 Landtag elections, Angela Merkel’s party, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), lost 8 seats for a total of 31. The AfD, in contrast, 
gained its first 25 seats.20 The AfD can no longer be dismissed as it was in the Economist 
article “Europe’s reluctant hegemon.” Speaking about the Fiscal Reforms needed at the 
                                                          
18 Pazderski, Georg. "Das Weissbuch Fuhrt Die Bundeswehr in Die Falsche Richtung." Alternative Fuer 
Deutschland. July 14, 2016. Accessed November 26, 2016. https://www.alternativefuer.de/pazderski-das-
weissbuch-fuehrt-die-bundeswehr-in-die-falsche-richtung/. 
19 "Questions and Answers: EU and Europe." Alternative Fuer Deutschland. Accessed November 26, 2016. 
https://www.alternativefuer.de/programm-hintergrund/fragen-und-antworten/zur-eu-und-europa/. 
20 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_state_election,_2016 
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time, the article noted, “with the exception of the Alternative fuer Deutschland, the new 
fringe party, all the parties agree,” and later left out the AfD completely, stating, “if there 
are differences [between the parties]…they are about the pace [of the fiscal reforms].”21 
If the AfD wins parliamentary seats in the 2017 German Federal Elections, the attainment 
of the Government goals set forth in the White Paper may be at risk. If the AfD wins a 
number of seats large enough to force itself into the winning coalition, it is not impossible 
that the White Paper would have to be essentially set aside.   
The ramifications would be far-reaching. The world at large is looking to 
Germany to steward the Western tradition in what they see as an impending phase of 
waning US influence. If German influence not only decelerated but shrank, world 
confidence could be shaken. NATO states, especially in the Baltic, would likely 
militarize to balance against Russia. Russia may see a less cohesive NATO and act even 
more aggressively. 
The White Paper is a product of the executive branch of the German government. 
Thus, the continuation of that executive branch is critical for the continuation and 
execution of the document’s central tenets. Chancellor Merkel has announced she will 
run for a fourth term, and there is a common consensus that she is running only because 
the CDU has no alternative candidate attractive enough to win. Even if she wins the 2017 
election, unless she starts grooming a successor soon, the CDU, “may end up leaderless 
                                                          
21 Beddoes, Zanny Minton. "Europe's Reluctant Hegemon." The Economist. June 15, 2013. Accessed 
October 01, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-now-dominant-
country-europe-needs-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and 
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by the 2021 election,” and the White Paper will be in just as much jeopardy then as it is 
currently.22  
The current German regime is stuck between a rock and hard place. The New 
York Times summarizes the situation by reporting that, “Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany, under siege domestically but widely seen as a pillar of Western liberalism, 
announced on Sunday that she will seek a fourth term next year.”23 The siege under 
which she falls, representing the rock, may be broadly rooted in the AfD, but it is not 
limited to it. The two sister parties, the CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), are 
in, “the throes of their worst internal crisis in over 40 years.”24 The southern CSU was 
and is firmly against Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the country’s borders to 
refugees. Chancellor Merkel’s hard place are crises like the Refugee and Debt Crisis. 
Agreements like the deal reached with Turkey may serve as the basis for solving these 
crises; however, Chancellor Merkel will need to sooth the German people and convince 
them that increased, not decreased integration within the EU is the only way to solve the 
crisis. 
Simon Tilford of the Center for European Reform notes the rising populist 
movement in France, and after prescribing actions Merkel can take to, “prevent the 
worsening of the political situation in France,” he declares, “[t]o help France and prevent 
                                                          
22 Bershidsky, Leonid. "Merkel's Fourth Election Will Be Her Toughest." Bloomberg.com. November 21, 
2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-21/merkel-s-
fourth-election-will-be-her-toughest. 
23 Smale, Alison. "Merkel to Seek 4th Term as Germany’s Leader." The New York Times. November 20, 
2016. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/europe/angela-merkel-
germany.html. 
24 Delcker, Janosch. "Angela Merkel’s Divided Union Veers toward Fall." POLITICO. June 06, 2016. 
Accessed November 29, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/rivalry-in-angela-merkels-union-gets-out-of-
hand-horst-seehofer-csu-cdu-germany-coalition/. 
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Le Pen [a right-wing presidential candidate] is to risk increased populism in Germany.”25 
The very reforms that would satisfy voters in the Eurozone (i.e. France) by loosening 
economic regulations would anger voters of the populist AfD in Germany. Chancellor 
Merkel will have to walk a very thin line between the realpolitik of growing her domestic 
base of support and pursuing the White Book’s strategy that calls for unprecedented levels 
of integration in the EU and strong support for NATO.  
If the CDU does not win the 2017 election, the White Paper is unlikely to be 
implemented. Yet attempting to implement its proposals now, before the election, will 
hurt the CDU’s chances in the election. However, if the current German government 
does not at least begin the implementation of the White Paper, the international 
community will dismiss Germany’s willingness, “to take on responsibility for Europe’s 
security,” as nothing more than lip service.26 The jury is out on whether Donald Trump’s 
election will shock Europeans into increased cooperation, thus easing the burden of 
responsibility on Merkel. Perhaps his election will divide Europe further as states rush 
into bi-lateral agreements with a United States that is skeptical of existing alliances.  
The purpose of my study is not to argue whether implementation of the White 
Paper is better than its non-implementation, but to analyze speed-bumps on the way 
toward its success. 
 Of the three pillars on which its successful implementation significantly rests, 
increased domestic support in the time leading up to the 2017 elections is the timeliest 
                                                          
25 Smale, Alison, and Steven Erlanger. "Donald Trump’s Election Leaves Angela Merkel as the Liberal 
West’s Last Defender." The New York Times. November 12, 2016. Accessed November 27, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/europe/germany-merkel-trump-election.html?_r=0. 
26 White Paper, 6.  
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and therefore most important. Responses to Russian influence can be developed 
simultaneously – something that will actually help the CDU maintain its standing among 
the electorate. Germany needs to pump enough bilge water to keep the promise of the 
European project afloat for another year, while ensuring that the next generation of the 
German leadership receive a mandate in 2017 to pursue the strategy of the White Paper. 
Deflating the influence Russia has on the German people will go a long way towards this 
goal. These three obstacles stand in the way of implementing the White Paper in the first 
place. If the White Paper survives these hurdles, it will become a part of German Security 
Policy. Only time can provide the perspective to judge if it contains the right strategies to 
pursue or not.   
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